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1. Introduction 
The conceptual point of departure for ACCEPT Pluralism is the distinction between (1) 
intolerance, (2) toleration and (3) various other, more demanding arrangements that exceed 
the minimalism of tolerance. On the basis of this minimalist distinction between three 
‘classes’ of acceptance, we draw attention to boundary issues – claims, conflicts and 
contestations – that arise in between the refusal and the concession of tolerance and between 
toleration and more demanding responses, such as full equality, or contested conceptions of a 
more demanding type of ‘acceptance’, including recognition and respect. The empirical work 
that has been completed in the project has established a considerable variety of ways in which 
boundaries of acceptance become an issue, often in response to claims put forward by 
minority groups but also when more narrow boundaries of tolerance are drawn in response to 
allegedly intolerable minority demands. Against the background of this work, the present 
report revisits and adds our perspective on three conceptual problems of tolerance/toleration 
that have been discussed extensively in social and political theory. Instead of offering a 
comprehensive review of the literature on these issues, we ask what lessons can be drawn 
from our project for the conceptual, theoretical and philosophical study of tolerance. 
First, normative theorists regularly argue about what it means or whether it makes sense to go 
‘beyond toleration’ – a question that has also been of considerable interest within the 
ACCEPT Pluralism project. The issue is usually addressed by way of a discussion of the 
conceptual structure of toleration and whether it can accommodate certain positions that tip 
the balance of ‘reasons’ that toleration contains in a more positive direction. Anna Elisabetta 
Galeotti’s (2002) work on toleration-as-recognition and her suggestion that, to obtain ‘equal 
terms of inclusion’ (2002: 193), this has to include the public destigmatization of stigmatized 
identities represents perhaps one example for how conceptual boundaries of tolerance are 
over-stretched. Beyond the concern with toleration’s conceptual scope, however, there are 
qualms that the promotion of recognition and respect for ‘difference’ means renouncing less 
demanding but more viable arrangements of toleration and, hence, harms the objective to 
preserve a form of ‘moral minimalism’. Such concerns have been put forward in addition to 
questions about how to best characterize minority claims, whether they are for toleration, 
recognition or respect, and what the state can or should do in response to such claims. The 
concern with options ‘beyond toleration’ thus points towards issues that may be resolved 
differently, depending on whether one’s starting point is the conceptual scope of toleration, 
the empirical presence of claims for recognition or respect, or some understanding of the type 
of political response that one would expect from the state, state agencies or embedded in 
social relations or civic institutions. We revisit the issue in this report and offer our 
perspective on the need to go ‘beyond’ toleration and related problems.  
A second set of issues concerns the socio-historical place of tolerance and its political 
functions. Wendy Brown (2006: 36) has defined one such function as ‘to contain potential 
crises […] that threaten to reveal the shallow reach of liberal equality and the partiality of 
liberal universality’. Brown acknowledges that the understanding of tolerance as 
governmentality does not require us to abandon the idea altogether (2006: 174–175); in her 
account an appropriately historicized perspective on tolerance offers a new humility and 
improved prospects for civilizational encounters.1 But the implications of critical charges on 
tolerance by Brown and others remain somewhat unclear. What is left after the regulatory 
functions and liberal presuppositions of tolerance have been revealed? As much as the 
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 We acknowledge that there is a distinction between principles of tolerance and attitudes or practices of toleration. For the 
purpose of our discussion in this report, we only maintain this distinction where it is required to comment on issues in 
normative political theory. 
 concept may be tainted by its role in how Western civilizational superiority is affirmed and 
‘others’ are stigmatized, its role in supplying a language for political claims by minorities and 
for conceptualizing decent responses to cultural pluralism should not be discounted on the 
basis of this critique. In a second step, we thus explore recent deployments of tolerance in 
elite political discourse before revisiting the critique of tolerance. 
The third issue arises in relation to the balancing of reasons that forms part of how toleration 
is commonly understood. Current advances in tolerance theory often pay particular attention 
to what reasons count as eligible, either as negatively ineligible or as justifications for 
forbearance that can override the impulse to reject. Such considerations have been amended 
by scholars of toleration who stress the significance of perceptions, of pre-existing and 
ongoing relationships between tolerator and tolerated, or of communication and deliberation. 
For the most part, acts of everyday intolerance, from the casual discrimination that individuals 
may suffer in employment towards racist violence in the streets, do not raise questions about 
reasons, and why they weren’t balanced, but about socialization, the internalization of norms 
of conduct and social institutions as well as the wider social climate that fails to provide 
safeguards against or even precipitates intolerance. This would speak for a sociologically 
grounded view on values and attitudes and a concern with learning, as Veit Bader (2007; 
2013) has suggested, to complement the preoccupation with ideal reasons and their 
justifications. Our response is to argue for a combination of approaches and we highlight the 
way in which the ACCEPT Pluralism project has provided new perspectives on discourses, 
policies and practices of tolerance. In a third step, we illustrate this with a review of two 
significanct strands of non-acceptance in contemporary Europe: liberal and ethno-cultural 
intolerance. 
2. Beyond toleration? Comments on the classes of acceptance 
The concept of tolerance/toleration is characterized by some inherent problems and 
limitations and, at least in a conventional conceptual understanding, is widely considered a 
non-ideal state of affairs for being compatible with various degrees of inequality and 
oppression.
1
 Yet it has also been argued that toleration is necessary and may even be, in 
challenging circumstances, a desirable solution. It is unlikely that the presence of culturally 
diverse populations in European countries will cease to be challenging in all sorts of ways, 
and we are not the first to suggest that the minimalism of toleration is infinitely more 
attractive than many alternatives. As a result of increasing diversity, value pluralism means 
that we need a way of reconciling ourselves with differences we disagree with, which may be 
deep and difficult to bridge. Respect for the other’s individuality, reason and human standing, 
or the fact of common citizenship, can provide grounds for putting disagreement into 
perspective and thus for tolerance. Tolerance is objection that is balanced by reasons for 
acceptance, and this balancing is not just a practical necessity in the absence of better options. 
The attitudes it requires are virtues that pluralist societies cannot do without.2 
There are reasons, however, to consider the inherent logic that is contained in such virtues, 
which in some cases points ‘beyond’ toleration and towards a situation where difference is 
normalized and ‘does not make a difference’ (Schiffauer, 2013), or where ‘negative’ becomes 
‘positive difference’ (Modood, 2007: 61). David Heyd (2003: 205) suggests that ‘by acquiring 
a tolerant disposition, we progressively move towards full recognition of at least some of the 
opinions and practices of other people’. This trajectory beyond toleration would seem to 
correspond with Goethe’s suggestion that – since ‘to tolerate is to insult’ – ‘tolerance can only 
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 This emphasis on competencies resembles suggestions by theorists of ‘radical democracy’, although these authors usually 
distinguish their position from that of ‘liberal tolerance’ (see Mouffe, 2000, 101-102; Connolly, 2005: 123, 173, Fn. 10, 
on tolerance and ‘agonistic respect’). 
  
be provisional and must lead to recognition’ (cited and discussed in Forst, 2007). Yet this 
conception fails to hold up. Tolerance is not a mere stopgap that we condone while waiting 
for superior normative arrangements to emerge. The movement from tolerance towards 
recognition or full equality is uncertain and there are many circumstances where, even after 
exhaustive opportunities to revisit one’s objection, this does not happen and not reconciliation 
but peacekeeping remains a priority. While the movement beyond toleration is anything but 
necessary – we are provided with numerous examples where minimally tolerant arrangements 
disintegrate into violent persecution – it remains a possibility. The civic equality and 
confessional pluralism that European states achieved (for the most part) only became possible 
after the consolidation of various non-ideal, yet minimally tolerant, arrangements in the 
aftermath of Europe’s wars of religion. Toleration thus protects a minimalist ‘modus vivendi’, 
yet it comprises attitudes and reasons that exceed minimalism and contain not a necessary 
drift but at least intimations of more demanding moral arrangements. 
A different way of unpacking the relationship between tolerance and recognition or respect is 
to suggest with Veit Bader (2013, add) that, while it makes little sense to introduce a 
hierarchy of classes of acceptance, toleration needs to be backed up by more demanding 
principles and virtues in order to be a stable and reliable arrangement. This would seem to 
provide for a reasonably complex view on the ‘classes’ of acceptance, none of which we can 
expect to be socially prevalent at any point in time. Multiple normativities are expressed in 
social attitudes, conceptions of values, political institutions and laws. This suggests that, 
rather than discussing the relative merits of any particular concept of ‘acceptance’, we should 
explore how different normative classes interact and sustain societies that are, in one 
combination or another, as tolerant and respectful of cultural diversity as possible. 
In the debate about whether it makes sense or is desirable to ‘go beyond’ toleration, it is in 
particular some concern about the dispersal of such norms and the role of the state that leads 
to disagreement. The challenge is about the role that the state and public institutions can play 
in fostering or demanding certain attitudes and virtues. Respect or esteem are difficult to 
generalize and impossible to require on an individual basis for the same reasons that Locke 
gave for freedom of conscience: these are ‘opinions and actions that are wholly separate from 
the concernment of the state’ (Locke, 2006: 288). Additional concerns, such as whether it 
makes sense to conceive of the state as an agent that dispenses tolerance or recognition (see 
Lægaard 2013), seem perhaps less urgent than the claim that a universal regime of state-
sponsored recognition may be not just impractical but ultimately undesirable and intrusive 
(Webber, 2010). 
Theorists of recognition, however, stress that the exercise of recognition is not limited to state 
action. States have a role to play – but only within much larger social processes. For Taylor 
(1994), recognition is dialogical and cannot be left to politicians or captured in legal 
instruments; it consists of two (or more) collectivities with a history of domination-
subordination that acknowledge each other within a shared political sphere. They seek to 
move beyond that historical relationship through allowing each to be true to itself – ‘deep 
diversity’ – while developing commonalities through mutual understanding – a ‘fusion of 
horizons’. Galeotti (2002) argues that toleration in a context of contemporary cultural 
diversity cannot simply be a form of benign neglect but requires active policies of equal 
opportunities and inclusivity. While the state must lead this implementation of equality, she 
believes that the media, intellectuals, employers, trade unions, the churches, neighbourhood 
associations and so on have to participate in their own way for equality – ‘toleration as 
recognition’ – to be realized. Similarly, for Modood (2007), multicultural recognition is a 
civic idea, meaning that it is created and exists in horizontal relations among citizens and not 
just the vertical spaces between the state and citizens. 
 While the fundamental difference between minimalist toleration and more demanding forms 
of acceptance is that the latter, but not the former, requires sustained action against the 
negative perceptions of the ‘other’, the state is not the exclusive agent in attacking ‘negative 
difference’. Such activist forms of acceptance are not simply focused on minorities. They 
require an affirmation of minority identities – namely, of those identities that are of 
importance to minorities – but they also require a remaking and a pluralizing of the common 
identity, the greater ‘We’. 
Finally, a strict distinction between the governing of behaviour and practices and a laisser-
faire as regards beliefs and opinions is unsustainable where intolerance flows out of beliefs 
such as racism. On such matters liberal states do not claim to be neutral and, at least in liberal 
theory, use a combination of law, public censure, debate and education (including state 
schools) to channel beliefs and attitudes away from, for example, sexism and racism and 
towards forms of acceptance and equality that these ideologies deny. Yet for some liberals, 
the problem with recognition and respect as political concepts is not just that they push the 
state from regulating behaviour to ‘thought-control’ but also that they introduce notions of 
collective identities, such as blacks or Roma or Muslims, which are not sensitive to the 
heterogeneity that exists in all groups (see Brubaker, 2012). 
In addition to the interest in relations between different ‘classes’ and normative options, we 
wish to highlight the significance of perceptions of difference and that toleration is a device 
that structures the relationship with perceived ‘others’. Werner Schiffauer suggests that the 
conventional conception of toleration needs to be amended to explore how visibly ‘abnormal’ 
differences may become ‘normal’ and thus potentially invisible. The question is how such 
differences are socially defined as tolerable and intolerable and why some, and not others, 
become the subject of heated debates. In the current situation, changing types of liberal-
intolerant argumentation play a particular role in shifting the boundaries of tolerable 
difference. As Mouritsen and Olsen (2013) see it, the challenge is to ‘desecuritize’ the 
assumptions and scenarios that underpin the liberal turn towards intolerance and to develop a 
more inclusive position than perfectionist liberalism and its stigmatization of others as 
intolerably illiberal. 
When considering the ‘classes’ of acceptance, such as in the context of political efforts to 
make liberalism ‘more muscular’, we are dealing with contexts that are characterized by 
established relationships and attitudes towards ‘significant others’. There are conceptual 
frameworks and languages of minority accommodation that have developed over time. In fact, 
intolerant outcomes in a number of European contexts seem to result at least partially from 
perspectives on minority ‘difference’ that prioritize the experience of one group but fail to 
take account of divergent experiences and claims. Responding to this difficulty, 
Triandafyllidou (2013), for example, argues that the challenge for countries in South-East 
Europe is to ‘open up their diversity spectrum’ and to arrive at a form of ‘plural nationalism’ 
that takes notice of established minority groups as well as of more recent newcomers. 
It is a more general phenomenon that limited spaces on the ‘diversity spectrum’ accounts for 
intolerant outcomes. In Great Britain, there is a tendency among urban geographers and 
cultural theorists to posit the novelty of minority experiences (highlighting, for example, their 
newly networked, cosmopolitan or ‘super-diverse’ character) and to forget that such 
experiences are usually multifaceted and diverse both between different as well as within 
particular groups (see Walzer, 1997; Modood, 1998; Modood and Dobbernack, 2013). 
Conceptions of toleration or respect and recognition, inasmuch as they prioritize particular 
understandings of minority ‘difference’, can be questioned for whether they cover the 
spectrum of actual cultural differences and identities. Self-evidently, acceptance is easier to 
obtain for ‘differences’ that are politically privileged while it is more difficult to achieve for 
  
those that aren’t registered as part of the official nomenclature of visible and valid minority 
difference. 
Collectively our project work show that there has to be a double interest: in the indispensable 
role of minimal and more demanding concepts of toleration and acceptance in relation to 
contemporary diversity challenges as well as in the significance of such concepts in 
organizing debates, drawing boundaries and structuring relationships between majority and 
minorities. In the following we propose to revisits some aspects of the double concern with 
political or discursive deployments of acceptance and its normative purposes to reinforce the 
case for a complementary perspective. We first consider the role of toleration in current 
efforts to delineate national identities before examining critical challenges to liberal toleration 
and what the appropriate response to such challenges should be. 
3. The critique and remaining value of tolerance 
Religious tolerance in particular is one of the key elements by which liberal universalism is 
distinguished from its historical precursors as well from illiberal others outside of or at the 
margins of Europe. The ‘persecuting society’ (Moore, 1987) of medieval and early modern 
Europe is contrasted with fully achieved rights and freedoms in liberal democracies. Such 
distinctions, both temporal and geographical, often reflect ‘present investments’ (Collins, 
2009: 609) in that a historical movement is seen to support or reinforce contemporary 
objectives. Presentist histories of toleration have been questioned for a number of reasons, 
among them the resilience of persecution well after the alleged decline of the ‘persecuting 
society’ or a lack of concern with social practices (Walsham, 2006; Kaplan, 2007). Yet 
regarding the constitutive role of tolerance in how liberal-democratic polities conceive of their 
identity, it would seem rather misguided to reject its value on the basis of such historical 
misunderstandings. After all, we should expect the tolerance of difference to be a principle 
that is widely promoted and placated by policy-makers and state officials as well as in public 
education where values and attitudes of toleration are supposed to be learnt and practised (see 
Maussen and Bader, 2012). Not the constitutive role of tolerance for liberal identities but the 
definition of intolerable antagonists and a certain liberal triumphalism constitute a problem 
that requires critical attention. The following briefly revisits the place of the concept in recent 
attempts to define Britishness, German Leitkultur and French identité nationale. 
The previous British prime minister, Gordon Brown, prioritized toleration in his concern to 
identify core values of ‘Britishness’ (see Davison, 2011). He suggested that ‘a strong sense of 
national identity derives from the particular, the special things we cherish’, and that among 
those things were ‘a passion for liberty anchored in a sense of duty and an intrinsic 
commitment to tolerance and fair play’ (Brown, 2004). When ‘taken together they add up to a 
distinctive Britishness that has been manifest throughout our history and has shaped it’. 
Brown’s successor, David Cameron, speaks of the need to readjust past excesses of toleration: 
‘a genuinely liberal country … believes in certain values and actively promotes them’. To 
achieve ‘stronger societies and stronger identities’, it is necessary to be ‘unambiguous and 
hard-nosed about this defence of our liberty’, whereas ‘hands-off tolerance has only served to 
reinforce the sense that not enough is shared’ (Cameron, 2011). The new account is that 
previous manifestations of tolerance have led to moral ambiguity and that, without losing its 
central role in British self-understandings, tolerance needs to become more active, aggressive 
and hands-on. 
Tolerance plays a related role in recent debates about German national identity. Conceived in 
contrast to ‘relativist multiculturalism’, Bassam Tibi (2001) points to tolerance as one of four 
characteristics of European Leitkultur. Attempts to delineate a specifically German Leitkultur 
usually refer to toleration as a distinctive achievement of the Enlightenment or of the ‘Judeo-
Christian heritage’. Friedrich Merz (2000) conceived of Leitkultur as a resolution to pressing 
 questions about ‘peaceful and tolerant’ coexistence. Similar to Cameron’s attack on ‘passive 
tolerance’, he suggested that uncommitted and relativist liberals (Gutmenschen) had stifled 
the development of a strong national identity. He suggested, ‘the receiving country has to be 
tolerant and open, immigrants that wish to live with us either permanently or for some time 
have to be prepared to respect the rules of coexistence in Germany.’ Angela Merkel’s 
contribution to the Leitkultur debate was to ask for ‘a clear commitment to the nation (Nation 
und Vaterland), to an open-minded patriotism, to tolerance and to moral courage’ (cited in 
Dürr, 2010). 
Nicolas Sarkozy’s (2009a) recent attempt to instigate a debate about French national identity 
presented an occasion to define tolerance in the republican context.3 As in the case of 
Leitkultur, the conditionality of tolerance upon the embrace of a number of republican tenets 
was newly emphasized. Sarkozy (2009a) suggested, in a comment on the outcome of the 
Swiss referendum on the construction of minarets, that ‘France is a country of tolerance and 
respect. But France also has to be respected.’ He pointed to the ‘contempt for the people’ 
exhibited by critics of the Swiss ban. Contrary to such misrepresentations, ‘the peoples of 
Europe are friendly, are tolerant, it is in their nature and their culture. But they do not want 
their lifestyle, their way of thinking and their social relations to be distorted (dénaturés).’ 
Addressing his ‘Muslim compatriots’, Sarkozy (2009b) proclaimed that he would ‘do 
everything to make them feel like other citizens, enjoying the same rights as all others to live 
their faith, to practise their religion with the same freedom and dignity’. But religiosity (of 
whatever faith) would need to be practised ‘with humble discretion which – rather than being 
a reflection of half-heartedness – corresponds to the fraternal respect felt towards those who 
do not think alike, with whom one wants to live’. The republic is conceived as a space of 
toleration, including for religion, yet respect towards republican norms means that its 
practice-based and publicly visible (so-called ostensible) manifestations face significant 
limitations and are subject to an expectation of  cultural assimilation, if possible, and the law, 
if necessary. 
In these cases toleration plays a role in the definition of a national self within a ‘civilizational 
frame’. This role does not provide for the reaffirmation of liberal inclusivity or for the 
extension of boundaries of acceptance but for new conditionalities of acceptance upon the 
public endorsement of a number of liberal, republican or secular tenets. The domain of 
intolerable difference is more rigidly demarcated and national identities defined in opposition 
to antagonistic others which cannot be tolerated. In such deployments of liberal tolerance, the 
advocacy of which within Europe is not confined to France, the concept functions as ‘part of 
what defines the superiority of Western civilization, and as that which marks certain non-
Western practices or regimes as intolerable’ (Brown, 2006: 179). While this interpretation of 
the political functions of tolerance seems harmful and problematic in its own right, it stands in 
a particularly stark contrast with the focus on deliberation, reasoning and communication that 
normative theorists identify in idealized acts of toleration. 
While this role of toleration in antagonistic identity constructions needs to be scrutinized, 
there is a risk in overstating its significance when evaluating the concept. The value of 
toleration will not be exclusively determined by the meaning it obtains in a certain type of 
political discourse and there are different discursive circumstances where the concept is less 
antagonistically charged than in some of the speech acts mentioned above. The bottom-up 
relevance of toleration in political claims-making and its usefulness in how minorities may 
appeal to minimal standards of liberal decency may not be affected by this elite discourse, 
which of course is itself challenged by other conceptions of tolerance. Liberal arguments can 
obviously be deployed to justify both tolerance and intolerance depending on the standards 
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that are invoked and on the questions asked. The political ideology of liberalism is not unitary 
(see Galston, 1995; Gray, 2000) and it would be wrong to suggest that toleration as such, or 
even specifically liberal toleration, has been damaged by its role in exclusionary rhetoric. It 
seems to us that a more compelling critique of tolerance would need to be based on an 
investigation of its benefits and limitations for the multicultural accommodation of ethno-
religious minorities within a framework of shared and equal citizenship. 
In order to further pursue some of its ambiguities, the following explores aspects of the 
critique of liberal tolerance in social theory. However, political functions of tolerance have 
been of critical interest before the recently accelerated shift towards liberal-intolerant 
argumentation. For Herbert Marcuse (1969: 95), manifestations of tolerance in the liberal 
state serve ‘the cause of oppression’; tolerance is defined and practised against ‘the effective 
background limitations imposed by its class structure’ (1969: 100). The ‘ideology of tolerance 
[…] favors and fortifies the conservation of the status quo of inequality and discrimination’ 
(1969: 136). Marcuse proposes to examine the concept for how it conceals relationships of 
‘domination’ (1969: 109, 119) and thus shares a conceptual perspective with – while arriving 
at different conclusions from –certain neo-republican contributions to tolerance theory 
(Honohan, 2013). 
Recent critical approaches share with Marcuse the objective to ‘politicize’ the concept of 
toleration (eg, Žižek, 1997: 37; Brown, 2006: 13, 197-198).4 They differ in that their critical 
perspectives usually owe more to Michael Foucault than to Marxist critique of ideology. 
Much of the recent scrutiny that liberal toleration has received in critical social theory begins 
with its role in the ‘clash of civilizations’. 9/11 brought Islam into the focus of Western public 
debate in a way that frequently involved a contrast between empirical aspects of Muslim 
religious or political practice and highly idealized accounts of Western values and principles. 
In this context the compatibility of Islamic traditions with those of liberalism, including the 
liberal emphasis on toleration, has become an issue of some public interest. Under the 
immediate impression of 9/11, Khaled Abou El Fadl (2001) explored Islamic resources for 
toleration and pointed to a trajectory towards tolerance that had informed historical practices 
in many Muslim countries and that only recently had been distorted by ‘modern puritans’: 
‘the burden and blessing of sustaining that moral trajectory – of accentuating the Qur’anic 
message of tolerance and openness to the other – falls squarely on the shoulders of 
contemporary Muslim interpreters of the tradition’ (Abou El Fadl, 2001). Regarding his 
arguments about toleration and democratic governance (Abou El Fadl, 2003), Saba Mahmood 
(2003) took issue with the ‘burden’ put on Muslims to demonstrate Islamic resources of 
toleration or democracy. As Mahmood (2005: 189) put it in The Politics of Piety, ‘[t]he events 
of September 11, 2001, have only served to strengthen the sense that it is a secular-liberal 
inquisition before which Islam must be made to confess.’ Conversely, Mahmood suggested 
that Islamic resources might provide the occasion for a ‘two-way translation’ and for a 
learning experience by adherents of liberal democracy who could benefit from such 
encounters. Rather than asking how Islam fits with democracy and tolerance, one of the 
questions that should be asked is: how should we ‘rethink the politics of tolerance and 
pluralism beyond the confines of individualism to include the rights of plural social 
grouping?’ (Mahmood, 2003). Wendy Brown (2006: 174) similarly suggests that the critique 
of toleration might provide an ‘occasion to open liberal regimes to reflection on the false 
conceits of their cultural and religious secularism’.5 
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 Žižek (1997: 37), for example, suggests that ‘[l]iberal “tolerance” condones the folklorist Other deprived of its substance – 
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5
 In line with such concerns, Talal Asad (2003: 8) suggests that a ‘secular state does not guarantee toleration; it puts into play 
different structures of ambition and fear’. Asad’s suggestions are reminiscent of the Enlightenment of Frankfurt School 
 Accounts that question the political uses and abuses of toleration in this volume, as well as 
more generally, usually do not make the case for its dismissal but point out where it needs to 
be reconsidered or stripped of the triumphalism that accompanies some of its political 
deployments. Brown intends to ‘reveal the operations of power, governance, and subject 
production entailed in particular deployments of tolerance’ and to puncture ‘the aura of pure 
goodness that contemporary invocations of tolerance carry’ (Brown, 2006: 10). Liberal 
intolerance is intertwined with the ‘valorization of individual autonomy’ while 
‘fundamentalism is equated with the valorization of culture and religion at the expense of the 
individual, an expense that makes such orders intolerable from a liberal vantage point’ 
(Brown, 2006: 166). 
The realization that liberal tolerance does not reach as far as some would suggest, should in 
itself not be particularly surprising. Its political deployments in the clash of civilizations, in 
exclusionary constructions of national identity and in the language of contemporary ‘identity 
liberalism’ show that there are even more severe problems with liberal toleration than its 
universalist façade. Yet, if liberal tolerance is implicated in ‘operations of power, governance 
and subject production’, what is the alternative? If liberal toleration is normatively 
inadequate, does it at least offer the basis for its own improvement, or is it best to start 
elsewhere? In his critique of Wendy Brown, Slavoj Žižek (2008: 667) in fact suggests that 
‘denouncing the false universality’ of tolerance as an ideological category does only half of 
the critical work that is needed. The other half would need to consider ‘the rise of universality 
out of the particular life-world’ (2008: 670). Regardless of the type of language that we use to 
characterize this movement, we can acknowledge that political actors may discover that the 
language of tolerance provides a starting point in struggles for decent treatment and political 
inclusion. The non-liberal origins of tolerance indicate that such struggles can be waged by 
drawing on a multiplicity of resources. The need for humility that Brown and others demand 
is furthermore reinforced by any cautious study of non-Christian, non-liberal and non-
Western intellectual foundations for and social practices of toleration (Parekh, 2013).  
4. Examining contemporary intolerance 
In this final section we briefly review two contemporary sources of intolerance – liberal and 
civic versus ethnic and national – discuss their relationship and use this review to offer some 
suggestions for the analysis of acceptance and intolerance in social and political life. Across 
much of Europe, there has been a new focus in the political resistance to cultural pluralism. 
Rather than rejecting the presence of minority groups for their affront to ideas of racial purity 
and ethno-national homogeneity, it has become more common to highlight their 
incompatibility with liberal norms and values. It is an assertive, perfectionist or ‘muscular’ 
liberalism that plays a particular role in mobilizations against ‘Islamization’ and various 
aspects of the Muslim presence in European countries. This liberalism comes in a number of 
contextually specific flavours and, rather than representing a wholesale paradigm shift in the 
debate about ethnic minority integration, often harks back to older ethno-nationalist ideas (see 
Mouritsen, 2013). Indeed, the insistence on liberal principles, and the threat that Muslims are 
seen represent, has become the central plank of formations such as Geert Wilders’ Partij voor 
de Vrijheid (PVV) or the English Defence League (EDL). These groupings contrast their 
hostility to ‘Islamization’ with an endorsement of racial diversity, which they seek to attest to 
through demonstrations of their ‘race-blindness’, not anti-racism.  
(Contd.)                                                                  
theorists in the 1940s (Adorno and Horkheimer, 1986) or more recent suggestions by Zygmunt Bauman (1990) on 
intolerable ‘strangers’. It identifies an antagonism at the heart of liberalism: ‘the liberal must continually attack the 
darkness of the outside world that threatens to overwhelm that space’ (Asad, 2003: 59-60; see also 2003). Tolerance is 
inevitably part of the liberal’s attempt to regulate difference and to soothe his/her fundamental anxiety about otherness. 
  
Within the political mainstream and elite discourse, as we have suggested above, the language 
of ‘muscular liberalism’ sees national identities of European states re-defined to limit the 
presence of ‘illiberal’ others. The new case for principled intolerance towards those others 
goes hand in hand with the vocal appreciation of the diversity of cosmopolitan lifestyles, 
which are not narrowly based in ethno-religious or group identities. In all this, tolerance is a 
key element that is defined, contested and mobilized, often in line with the logic of the clash 
of civilizations: it is their intolerance that makes us revise our toleration. This binary 
perspective has been applied for example as part of the trade-off that allegedly has to be made 
between religious freedom and the freedom to express sexual identities. A new logic of 
intolerance targets civilizational ‘others’ that are said to be intolerant of the liberal ‘self’ 
(Butler, 2010; Lentin and Titley, 2011: 224-5). 
While ‘liberalism with guts’ (Bolkestein, 1991) is anything but new, its themes have become 
more popular and have come to constitutes one of the main ways in which minority 
integration is discussed and political responses are conceived. David Cameron’s (2011) 
reference to ‘muscular liberalism’ at a speech in Munich exemplifies one such way in which 
liberal values – such as gender equality, ‘moderate’ religiosity or the rule of law – are asserted 
in relation to challenging experiences of cultural diversity. Characteristic for similar 
interventions across Europe, Cameron introduced ‘muscular liberalism’ in terms of a 
departure from the ‘failed policies of the past’, notably those that failed to insist on substantial 
standards of liberal conduct. He pointed to how it had become ‘hard to identify with Britain 
… because we have allowed the weakening of our collective identity’. The ‘doctrine of state 
multiculturalism’ had encouraged segregation and there was no ‘vision of society’ to which 
young Muslims feel they could belong. Minority status and ‘political correctness’, in turn, had 
shielded some groups from criticism for their illiberal practices. There should be more 
activism, engagement and liberal assertiveness. Some of this could be obtained through ‘a 
clear sense of shared national identity that is open to everyone’. Beyond the rhetorical shift 
towards muscular liberalism, it is not always very clear what the concrete changes in minority 
accommodation policies are that result from the new emphasis. In the British case, this 
appears to be a gradual departure from a cooperative engagement with Muslim organizations.  
This type of intolerance, which is presented in the form of a liberal concern with individual 
autonomy, equality and reasonableness, appears as distinct from other types of intolerance 
that are at work in different parts of Europe. In countries such as Greece, rising intolerance 
emerges in the form of a reactionary nationalism in the context of a multifaceted crisis. This 
intolerance can be attributed to the ‘ethno-cultural’ conception of nationhood dominant in 
national traditions of belonging and to the ‘Eastern’ heritage of the country. The conceptual 
and argumentative background of this intolerance, which assumes an ‘ethno-cultural’ 
conception of belonging to the nation, and the liberal intolerance that highlights universal and 
value-based forms of belonging, seem rather distinct. Yet in both cases intolerance is 
presented and requested in the form of a re-balancing of (or backlash against) more generous 
arrangements of immigrant and minority incorporation.  
This backlash of intolerance in different countries is based upon similar conceptual grounds: 
an increasing sense of crisis that makes notions such as equality and tolerance irrelevant and 
fosters hierarchies between in- groups and out- groups; a manipulation of the immigrants, 
those ‘significant others’ so as to boost social cohesion; a cynicism towards ‘politically 
correct’ perspectives of multiculturalism, ‘too much diversity’ and human rights; a concern 
with cultural homogeneity and cultural practices which implies a resistance to minority 
accommodation while assigning blame to their ‘difference’. The most recent economic and 
political crisis in Greece, for example, marks a shift of political discourse in an ethno-cultural 
direction of closure and intolerance. Interestingly social and political actors turn tolerance on 
its head, just like it happens with liberal intolerance, arguing that it is precisely to protect 
democracy and the nation that they cannot tolerate migrants, their ‘inferior’ culture and 
 religious tradition. Even if the case of intolerance found in Greece cannot be conceived as 
‘liberal’, it is, though, ‘principled’, and justified by a conception of the national political 
order. It is ‘new’ as it follows from and reverses positive developments and of an opening up 
of migration and naturalisation policies favouring migrants integration (Pavlou 2009; 
Christopoulos 2012).  
There is little doubt that the civic/ethnic distinction as regards nationhood, and the 
liberal/nationalist dichotomy for tolerance, is helpful in partially clarifying the issues at stake. 
However, such dichotomies also simplify a rather more complicated reality where radical 
intolerance towards ‘others’ takes various shapes in different countries. Recent studies show 
that although different national traditions of nationhood significantly influence the citizenship 
models countries produce, yet these are constantly in interaction with broader geopolitical and 
economic developments, migration flows, politics, diaspora and colonial settlements, or 
power relations within each nation state (Christopoulos, 2012). It is often the case that the 
same citizen can defend a model of belonging to a nation that entails civic and ethnic 
elements, at the same time as national traditions most often entail both ‘trends’ (Medrano and 
Koenig, 2005). ‘There is no sustainable concept of political culture without history; all civic 
and democratic cultures are unavoidably integrated in specific national histories’ (Bader, 
1997: 780). The East-West divide in the conception of citizenship, as well as stark distinctions 
between liberal and ethno-cultural fundations for European intolerance, are equally put into 
question (Bauböck and Liebich, 2010). Different national traditions of citizenship are 
mobilized so as to justify a common trend, that of a rising intolerance towards the immigrant 
‘other’. European nation states put forward intolerance not as an exception to their political 
tenets but as emanating from those.  
The analysis of the ‘nationalist’ intolerance within the wider European context sheds some 
light also on liberal intolerance in countries in the North and North-West of Europe. Even if 
appealing to general liberal principles, such principles are drawn on in defense of cultural 
particularities, national institutional contexts and at the very end a narrow definition of 
European belonging. The generalized discourse of intolerance towards diversity, using a 
variety of arguments (more or less liberal, more or less nationalist) emerges as a ‘real’ and 
‘pragmatic’ response to multicultural threats that have been silenced due to a politically 
correct discourse on diversity. Intolerant positions across Europe do not even need to be 
justified as a the result of political choices, but are introduced as ‘objective’ necessities in 
order to restore ‘normality’ to the natural state of affairs that has been temporarily distorted 
by multicultural, or otherwise tolerant, arrangements for minorities. 
Analytically, this reinforces the need for a multi-disciplinary perspective. Studies that 
exclusively deal with the fate of ‘national models’ of minority integration – civic-universalist 
versus ethno-cultural, republican versus multiculturalist – are at risk of ignoring developments 
beneath the surface level of public proclamations (see Bertossi and Duyvendak, 2012). 
Regarding the exclusionary rhetoric that is directed at either illiberal or ethno-cultural 
outsiders, the point is not just that it is often exactly the same population that is targeted from 
both directions (‘illiberal’ outsiders also tend to be phenotypically different and it is Muslims 
that are seen to represent a challenge not just to liberal principles but also to ethno-cultural 
cohesion). Furthermore, when the belonging of such populations is put into doubt this occurs 
in the process of the construction of ‘We’ identities that in both cases operate according to 
broadly similar logics of exclusion and identity-creation. Repetative and ritualized hints to the 
‘failure’ of past models of immigrant integration, especially of multiculturalism, and the 
attack on ‘political correctness’ are widely shared. They should be studied for their discursive 
dynamics, yet we should also remain interested in the various activities and practices in which 
participants in the debate about the boundaries of tolerance take up ideas, interpret them but 
also change and shape their situation. This means adopting, as we have done in the ACCEPT 
Pluralism project, a hybrid approach and the combination of sociological, political and 
  
normative-theoretical concerns to respond to the contemporary situation of cultural diversity 
in Europe. 
5. Conclusion 
In this situation, debates about what can and cannot be accepted are more fluid than ever. 
While identities, lifestyles and practices that were previously stigmatized are publicly 
embraced, the boundaries of tolerance are drawn more narrowly for others, in particular for 
populations that allegedly do not live up to liberal-democratic standards. Such changes may 
be a reflection of sociological trends and how these are perceived and politically 
acknowledged. They may be the result of changing perspectives on race, of the 
reconsideration of ethno-religious difference within the liberal state and of new anxieties in 
particular about Europe’s Muslim populations. It is difficult to identify what is driving the re-
evaluation of ‘difference’, yet it seems clear that diverse ‘modalities’ of acceptance or non-
acceptance, sociological formations of difference and their treatment in political discourse 
have to be brought into focus in order to catch up with European debates about cultural 
pluralism. 
Social science and political theory have responded differently to this reality. The pluralization 
of differences has been of concern in sociology, ethnography and cultural theory, where 
emerging features of urban landscapes are seen to challenge the categories that guide the 
political accommodation of minorities. The concern with values and principles of minority 
accommodation is frequently absent in these accounts, which generally do not purport to 
evaluate prospects for tolerance or respect and are more concerned with the potentials of 
geographic or demographic situations. In turn, normative theory seems not particularly 
willing to register features – be they ‘old’ or ‘new’ – of the European multicultural condition. 
The balancing act of ‘reasons’ that normative theorists identify in toleration is frequently 
conceived without regard for sociological realities or the political debates in which the scope 
of tolerable and intolerable ‘difference’ shifts and is determined. 
A more complete account is needed not least because political exchanges about how much 
and what kind of cultural difference should be tolerated are usually multifaceted; sociological 
findings – such as national census data on cultural diversity – are normatively evaluated and 
questioned for their political repercussions. Complex patterns of European diversity are newly 
registered by participants in the public debate on the scope of acceptance in the liberal state. 
We have suggested that it is necessary to consider normative modalities of acceptance or non-
acceptance, their correspondence to sociological formations of difference and their treatment 
in political discourse. This report has followed the double interest in the normative value of 
tolerance and its relationship with more demanding options and in perspectives that critically 
examine the political uses of liberal toleration under certain interpretations. Without seeking 
to arrive at conclusions that would exhaust the issues that have been raised here, we believe 
that we can end with the following suggestions: 
 In relation to normative-conceptual concerns, the conflation of tolerance and more 
demanding concepts is not just normatively problematic but analytically unhelpful. 
While sympathetic to the strategy of developing a more demanding normative 
vocabulary, we believe that there is a risk of conceptual confusion here, one result of 
which is that we may lose the normative value of toleration. 
 The forbearance of toleration is of normative and pragmatic value – as many 
minorities know historically and today – and to disparage toleration because it falls 
short of, say, respect is politically short-sighted. ‘Gritted-teeth tolerance’ is the most 
practical solution in many circumstances, and it makes little sense to denounce it 
where more demanding notions are unavailable.  
  There are indeed things that we should not tolerate as well as those that we should be 
able to discuss. These include not only behaviours most people do not want to 
condone, such as racism and sexism. There is also a host of issues to do with post-
immigration ‘difference’ itself that are rightly discussed in this context. These include 
clitrodectomy, marriage at the age of puberty and/or under duress, polygamy and so 
on. 
 Regardless of one’s position on these, we do need a normative-conceptual space where 
what is tolerated and what is outlawed can be clearly discussed without being 
confused with recognition, respect and substantive equality. We need to separate 
intolerance from toleration as well as toleration from more demanding positions.  
 Having noted the continuing value of toleration, we cannot ignore its limitations, 
namely the element of disapproval and the fact that tolerance is consistent with – and 
in some cases hides – inequality and domination. In seeking a form of equality in a 
context of diversity, we may prefer a non-evaluative respect for others in which 
people, especially fellow citizens, have a right (which is not a gift of the powerful) to 
be included without assimilation or privatisation of their ‘difference’. We need to find 
ways to give expression to this respect in social relations and institutional 
accommodation.  
In all cases where intolerance, toleration and respect are possibilities, we need to acknowledge 
that positions are not beyond contestation, that the objects and boundaries of toleration are 
historically changing, and that there needs be a political concern with the relationship 
between tolerator and tolerated and whether it entails the elements of power, authority and 
domination. Such relationships, if they are concealed, need to be brought out and queried, for 
the boundaries that are drawn and for how decisions are made about what can and what can’t 
be tolerated. This is a particularly urgent task in light of the new ‘liberal intolerance’, which 
overlaps with, rather than having replaced, remaining forms of ‘ethno-nationalist intolerance’. 
Both of these make pragmatic types of accommodation appear more fragile and difficult to 
achieve. 
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